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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Arnendment-Failure to Appoint
Counsel as Denial of Due Process
By PAULINE NELSON AND .AMES E. JACKSON
Pauline Nelson, a graduate of the University of Colorado, is a junior at the
University of Denver College of Law and is Note and Comment Editor of DICTA.
James E. Jackson received his A. B. degree in 1956 from the University of Missouri,
where he was a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He is now a junior at the University of
Denver College of Law.
Defendant, a seventeen-year-old Negro boy with a seventh-grade
education, was arrested on October 26, 1938. Two days later, after questioning by police who apparently instilled in him a fear of mob violence,
he confessed to the murder of an elderly white woman. On October 29,
after pleading guilty, he was adjudged guilty of murder in the first
degree, sentenced to life imprisonment and transferred to the state prison.
At his arraignment he told the trial judge he did not want a lawyer,
and none was appointed. Twelve years later, in 1950, he filed a delayed
motion for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the
Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed. The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that because of the defendants' age, his mental capacity,
and the other circumstances of the case, he was not capable of intelligently and understandingly waiving his right to counsel. In accepting
the guilty plea the trial court denied the defendant a fair hearing, contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Moore v.
Michigan, 78 Sup. Ct. 191 (1957).
In a recent Colorado case the defendant, without benefit of counsel,
pleaded guilty to a charge of kidnapping and was sentenced to twentyfive to twenty-nine years in prison. When sentenced the defendant was
twenty-one years old, had only a sixth-grade education, and had served
one previous reformatory sentence. He had never been represented by
counsel and was unaware of his rights in this respect. Furthermore, he
was without money or friends in Colorado, had allegedly signed a confession of assault and battery and attempted car theft, had at first protested when the trial court read a charge of kidnapping, and had a
meritorious defense based on lack of intent. The arrest was made on
April 15, 1945. He was sentenced on April 16. In 1953 a motion to
vacate the judgment was denied by the district court, and the denial
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was affirmed without written opinion by the Colorado Supreme Court.'
In 1954, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the district court. On writ of error the supreme court held that the allegations
of denial of due process were not within the scope of inquiry in a petition for habeas corpus. In dictum the court stated that the defendant
had been afforded due process since the record showed the information
had been read to him, the consequence of his guilty plea had been explained, and evidence had been taken in aggravation or mitigation before
sentence. Freeman v. Tinsley, 308 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1957).
In these two cases there is a clear illustration of the liberality of
the federal courts, on the one hand, in finding that lack of counsel constitutes a denial of due process, and on the other hand the strictness of
some state courts in holding that where the procedure was fair no error
results from a failure to appoint counsel.
In the Freeman case the Colorado Supreme Court has placed a
very narrow construction on the writ of habeas corpus. The matters to
be considered in habeas corpus proceedings have been defined as (1)
whether the petitioner was convicted in a court having jurisdiction over
the person and subject matter, and (2) whether the sentence was within
the statutory limits. 2 Although there are no Colorado decisions in point,

the modern tendency has been to construe the question of lack of jurisdiction to include judgments which are void because fundamental constitutional rights have been violated. It has been said by the New Jersey
Supreme Court that a court which denies due process destroys its own
jurisdiction in the course of the proceedings.3
The effect of the Freeman case is to require a defendant who alleges
conviction in violation of due process to present these questions in a
writ of error to the original proceedings, at the risk of losing altogether
his right to assert such questions. The Moore case, on the other hand,
in requiring a new trial after twelve years, recognizes that the persons
most in need of broader constitutional safeguards are petitioners who,
like Moore and Freeman, find themselves in prison shortly after arrest,
and only years later acquire an understanding of their constitutional
rights.
The Freeman case was the second to be presented to the Colorado
court in which charges of denial of due process have been based on lack
of counsel. In Kelley v. People4 the court denied a motion for a writ
of error coram nobis on the ground that there had been no showing
that a contrary result would have been reached if counsel had been
appointed. The court reaffirmed this ruling in a case decided two months
requireafter the Freeman case, holding that there is no constitutional
5
ment that a defendant be informed of his right to counsel.
The first United States Supreme Court case to hold that lack of
effective counsel would constitute a denial of due process was Powell v.
Alabama,6 decided in 1932. Since that case the position of most courts
has been that the totality of facts surrounding each case must be considered in determining whether counsel should have been appointed.'
Some factors which courts have held might create a need for counsel are
1 Freeman v. People, 128 Colo. 99, 260 P.2d 603 (1953); cert. denied, 346 U.S.
(1953).
2 People ex rel. Metzger v. District Court, 121 Colo. 141, 215 P.2d 327 (1949).
parte Carter, 14 N.J. Super. 591, 82 A.2d 652 (1951).
.'Ex
4 120 Colo. 1, 206 P.2d 337 (1949).
5 Vigil v. People, 310 P.2d 552 (1957).
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
7 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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the defendant's youthfulness and lack of education or intelligence," the
complexity of the charges and possible defenses,' and the conduct of
the prosecutor and trial judge."
Under the latest rulings of many state courts" and of the United
States Supreme Court, including the Moore case and others, 2 the key
question is whether the defendant, in view of his individual capacity
and the other circumstances surrounding the trial, could have properly
defended himself. If not, lack of counsel would be a denial of due
process regardless of whether the record shows error or prejudice. 3 The
question then would be whether the trial was likely to be unfair. The
rationale behind these rulings is based upon a universally recognized
element of due process, the right to be heard. Where the defendant is
under such an incapacity that he is unable to make an intelligent plea
or properly defend himself, he is not given an effective opportunity to
be heard, and only an appointment of counsel will eliminate this defect.
Thus, due process guarantees
not only the right to be heard, but also
14
the means to be heard.
On the other hand, a few courts have used a different basis for
determining whether there is a right to counsel. These courts look to
the record to see if a fundamentally fair trial has been granted. 5 The
question becomes, did lack of counsel actually prejudice the defendant
as a matter of record? The rationale of these courts is based on another
universally recognized element of due process, the right to a fair trial.
Where a defendant has received a fair trial, he should not complain of
lack of counsel. 6 The main flaw in this reasoning is that a fair trial
includes many factors which do not appear of record. It is much more
difficult for an appellate court to weigh these external factors years later
and determine the fairness of the trial than to determine if there were
elements present which could have led to prejudice.
Colorado seems to have adopted the latter rule. The Kelley case
stated that some showing must be made that appointment of counsel
S Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
') Williams v. Kaiser. 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
10 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
11 McCarthy v.
Hudspeth. 166 Kan. 456, 201 P.2d 658 (1949): Raymond v. State,
192 Md. 602, 65 A.2d 285 (1948); State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 527, 38 N.W.2d 358 (1949);
Ex parte Cook, 84 Okla. 404, 183 P.2d 595 (1947).
12 Commonwealth ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Massey v. Moore.
348 U.S. 105 (1954): Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951): Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672
(1948); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
13 Cases cited notes 11 and 12, supra.
14 Massey v, Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954).
15 Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
16 Commonwealth ex rel. Ridenour v. McHugh, 178 Pa. Super. 69. 115 A.2d 808
(1955).
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would have brought a different result. In the Freeman case no mention
was made of the defendant's age, education or intelligence, nor of the
complexities of the charge. Instead the finding was based on the trial
judge's procedure, which the supreme court credited with adequately
guaranteeing the defendant due process.
The theory of the Freeman case undoubtedly could have great effect
upon trial judges in Colorado. In cases where the defendant does not
request counsel, if the judge believes he can comply with the procedural
requirements of a fair trial, no counsel need be appointed. This presents
him with the choice of assuming he can conduct a fair trial and not
appointing counsel, or assuming the trial he conducts will be unfair,
necessitating counsel for the accused. In this predicament, it would
seem likely that most judges would feel no compelling need for appointed counsel. However, the judge still must consider a possible hearing in federal courts, where the rule is based, not on procedural fairness
but on the individual defendant's need for assistance.
Another possible effect could be to eliminate most appeals in Colorado based on denial of due process for lack of counsel. The court has
said that (1) such matters must be presented on writ of error, and (2)
error or prejudice must be shown. Thus, where error is shown the judgment will probably be reversed on the basis of this error, and not for
denial of due process. Therefore, it would seem the right to counsel
has no substantive value, but only serves to emphasize errors appearing
on the record.
A comparison of the Moore and Freeman cases shows a striking
similarity in the facts and a striking contrast in the result. Moore was
a scared, uneducated youngster who wanted to "get it over with" and
be safe in prison. Freeman was only slightly older, just as uneducated,
and was without friends or relatives to advise him. Moore, the Court
said, was incapable of intelligently waiving his right to counsel and
therefore the failure to appoint counsel was a denial of due process.
Freeman was unaware and uninformed of his right to counsel, and nevertheless was found to have been fairly convicted.
The Colorado court assumes that if a defendant does not insist
on his right to counsel he waives it, although he has not been informed
of his rights. Under the facts of the Freeman case, a court following the
more liberal rule would question whether such a waiver was intelligently made, and in view of the defendant's capabilities and the complexity of the charge might very well have reached a contrary result.
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Trusts-Revocable Inter Vivos Trusts-Accumulation of Reserved
Powers as Effecting Validity
By ANTHONY

J.

DEUTSCH

Anthony J. Deutsch was graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1954
with the Ph. B. degree. He is a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
Cora Lee Von Brecht, administratrix of the estate of Gustavus Adolphus Von Brecht, brought an action against the Denver National Bank,
to set aside a trust agreement executed by the plaintiff's intestate under
which the bank was named trustee. In his intervivos trust, the settlor
had retained a life interest in the income together with the right to disapprove any sale or purchase of investments, in excess of one thousand
dollars, suggested by the trustee, and the right to revoke, modify or
amend the trust agreement. Plaintiff contended that the sum of powers,
rights, dominion and control reserved by the grantor rendered him the
virtual owner of the property and constituted the trust an illusory and
abortive attempt to evade the statute of wills.
In each of two memorandum opinions, the trial judge concluded
that the trust was void because it was testamentary in nature and did
not comply with the requisite formalities for execution of a will. In the
second memorandum opinion the trial judge also held that the trust
agreement created an agency, since the settlor retained virtual control
and dominion over the trust property. The Colorado Supreme Court
concluded that the sole matter for determination was the question of the
accumulation of reserved powers, and, reversing the lower court, held
that the reserved powers did not void the trust. Denver National Bank v.
Von Brecht, 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 165 (1958).
Insofar as the reservation of powers affects the validity of revocable
intervivos trusts, the courts are generally agreed that a reservation of the
power to amend, modify and revoke the trust agreement will not make
the trust testamentary.' Reservation of a power to withdraw, consume'
or dispose of 3 the principal or corpus of the trust property does not
invalidate the trust. Nor does the reservation of a beneficial life interest.'
Where the settlor reserved control over the trustee in matters of investment, management and administration of the trust estate, the trust was
held not testamentary in character.' These reserved powers have been
treated as conditions subsequent which may operate to defeat the interests
of the beneficiaries, but which, unexercised, do not prevent the vesting
of equitable title.'
One area of powers which has given rise to much litigation is that
dealing with the degree of control the grantor exercises over the trustee.
Is the trustee a bona fide trustee with important duties to perform or
is he merely an agent of the settlor of an illusory trust?7
1 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 29 F.2d 14 (2d
Society v. Mortgage Guarantee Co., 217 Cal. 9, 17 P.2d 105
Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.E.2d 113 (1944); Whalen
4 N.W.2d 737 (1942); Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 134 Ohio
2 United Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460

Cir. 1928); American Bible
(1932); National Shawmut
v. Swircin, 141 Neb. 650,
St. 1, 15 N.E.2d 627 (1938).
(W.D. Ark. 1946); Whalen

v. Swircin, supra note 1.
3 Rose v. Rose. 300 Mich. 73. 1 N.W.2d 458 (1942).
4 Cribbs v. Walker, 74 Ark. 104, 85 S.W. 244 (1905); Rose v. Rose, supra note 2;
Whalen v. Swircin, 141 Neb. 650, 4 N.W.2d 737, 739 (1942).
5 Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A.2d 819 (Del. 1957); Keck v.
McKinstry, 206 Iowa 1121,
221 N.W. 851 (1928); Leahy v. Old Colony Trust Co., 326 Mass. 49, 93 N.E.2d 238 (1950).
6 United Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Ark. 1946).
7 This question was forcefully set out in Stouse v.
First Nat'l Bank, 245 S.W.2d
914, 917 (Ky. 1952).
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Divergence of legal opinion on this problem has narrowed to two
general views, the conservative or New York rule, and the liberal or
Massachusetts view.' Aln examination of the cases, however, proves this
categorization to be general only, since each case presents its own peculiar
reasoning.
The New York rule of Newman v. Dore' represents the conservative viewpoint. A more liberal policy favoring "living trusts" originated
in the Massachusetts case of National Shawmut Bank v. Joy10 and has
been appropriately labeled the Masschusetts rule. The decision in the
Von Brecht case follows the Massachusetts rule.
The Liberal View
National Shawmut, the case most frequently cited in support of
revocable inter vivos trusts, contained a trust agreement which included
powers to alter and amend or to make payments from principal if necessary, and reserved a power of appointment as well as a life interest. In
addition, the bank trustee was specifically directed to hold, retain, invest
and reinvest the property solely in accordance with written instructions
of one Neville, a securities dealer. The legatees contended that this grant
of power to Neville, in effect reserved the power over investments to
the grantor himself. The Massachusetts court held the trust instrument
valid. Against each attack based on a reservation of power the court
ruled that the reservation did not invalidate the trust, and for each
conclusion cited a long list of cases. The only reasoned conclusion concerned the investment supervision of Neville. Here the court held that
the powers given to Neville did not make the trust a passive one because
important duties were left to the trustees. 1 This conclusion holding
revocable inter vivos trusts valid has been followed by the majority of
court albeit for a variety of reasons.
In Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 2 the Ohio Court held that certain
reserved powers were not sufficiently broad to destroy the trust or to
reduce the trustee to a mere agent of the settlor. Here the exercise of
reserved powers was made dependent upon the trustee's acquiescence.
Against the appellants' contention in a Kentucky case' 3 that the trustee
was an agent of the grantor, the court held the trust valid. In so doing,
the court meticulously set forth the specific, well defined powers of the
trustee and specially noted that the grantor, unless she chose to revoke
the trust, could exercise no control over the assets except by giving directions within the terms of the trust instrument.
Nebraska has upheld a revocable trust on the basis that if the fund,
or any part of it, is permitted by the settlor to remain in existence, the
beneficiaries have the right to enforce the trust as against the trustee. 4
A federal court in Arkansas ruled that transfers of present interests to the
beneficiaries were effected and that powers reserved were in the nature of
s See Restatement, Trusts § 57 (1) (1935), covering the reservation rule. The details
of administration-agency rule are covered in § 57 (2). See also 1 Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees §§ 103-04 (1951); 1 Scott Trusts §§ 57.1, 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
9 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
10 National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass. 457, 53 N.U.2d 113 (1944).
11 53 N.E.2d at 125.
12 134 Ohio St. 1, 15 N.E.2d 627, 630 (1938).
13 Stouse v. First Nat'l Bank, 245 S.W.2d 914 (Ky. 1952).
'4 Whalen v. Swircin, 141 Neb. 650, 4 N.W.2d 737 (1942).
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conditions subsequent.15 Since the powers remained unexercised the
beneficiaries were entitled to have the trusts administered.
The important duties of the trustee in Rose v. Rose 6 had been cut
down. by a supplemental agreement made by the grantor five years after
he executed the original instrument. Yet the Michigan court held the
trust valid; for the trustee still had duties while the settlor lived, and
was to see that, after his death, inheritance taxes were paid from funds
made available for the latter purpose.
A 1950 Massachusetts case followed the precedent of the National
Shawmut
case, decided six years earlier. In Leahy v. Old Colony Trust
17
Co.,

the court found that the trustee was authorized, but not required,

to act under the grantor's direction. The trust was upheld since the
trustee had not been reduced to impotence, but retained important
powers, including that of deciding whether or not to follow the grantor's
directions.
A more complete and thorough reason for upholding a living trust
appeared in a 1951 Pennsylvania decision.' There the trustees were to
pay the settlor's children the net income or profits derived from the
property. Because there was a large measure of discretion incident to
paying some of the charges before arriving at net income, it was held
that the trustees had been given active duties to perform, by necessary
implication. Further, the court held that even if the trust had been
passive, the settlor would not thereby have retained title since the trust
would have been executed by the Statute of Uses which is force in Pennsylvania. In resolving the agency aspect of the attack on the trust, the
court relied on the fact that the transaction was formally executed.
In spite of extensive powers of control reserved by the settlor in an
early Illinois case, 9 the trust agreement was upheld because land was
the subject matter of the trust and there was a formal agreement. An20
extreme position was taken by the Iowa court in Keck v McKinstry.
There the trustor retained active management of the property during
his lifetime, and the performance of active duties by the trustee, besides
being postponed until after the trustor's death, was contingent upon
the trustee's surviving the trustor. The court held that there was no
semblance of an agency either in name or purpose since the acts of the
trustee would not be acts of the trustor but would be the trustee's own
acts in his own name as trustee.
An eminent scholar has criticised the courts for the extremely liberal
stand taken in construing inter vivos instruments to be valid deeds and
not invalid attempted wills." He has deounced the vesting of legal or
equitable interests as too nebulous to be recognized because the trust
can be revoked and all interests are subject to divestment. Rather, he22
suggests analogizing the problem to certain tax-developed principles
15 United Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrett, 64 F. Supp. 460 (W.D. Ark. 1946).
16 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W.2d 458 (1942). The Michigan Court refused to follow the
New York rule, finding that the grantor had not transferred property so as to
fraudulently deprive his wife of dower rights. The court found that the defendant
husband provided liberally for her, transferring a large part of his property to her
inter vivos by joint deeds and joint bank accounts.
17 326 Mass. 49, 93-N.E.2d 238 (1950).
18 In re Sheasley's Trust, 366 Pa. 316, 77 A.2d 448 (1951).
19 Kelly v. Parker, 181 Ill. 49. 54 N.E. 615 (1899). The Kelly case, along with
another early case, seemed to firmly align Illinois as liberal in upholding living trusts.
But see: Smith v. Northern Trust Co. 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.].2d 75 (1944) (instrument
held colorable and illusory citing the Newman case and following the New York rule).
20 206 Iowa 1121. 221 N.W. 851 (1928).
21 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §§ 103-04 (3d ed. 1952).
'"2See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2038(a)(1) (estate tax provision governing

revocable transfers).
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under which settlors of revocable trusts are considered the owners of
the trust corpus for purposes of federal income and estate taxation.
Another author has disagreed with this reasoning and patterned his
views along the lines of the Massachusetts rule.2"
Divergent views of the supreme courts of two states met head-on
in Lewis v. Hanson.24 In that case the grantor, a Pennsylvania resident,
entered into a trust agreement with a Delaware trustee in 1935. In 1944
the grantor moved to Florida where she was domiciled at her death in
1952. The Florida court ruled the trust invalid while the Delaware
court upheld its validity. The main thrust of the attack was based on
limitations of the trustee's power to act only with the consent of a trust
advisor. The trustor reserved power to name and change the advisor.2 1
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the powers of the trust advisor
did not prevent the trustee from exercising independent judgment.'
Apparently the Florida court based its decision on the theory that each
exercise of a power of appointment 27 was an amendment and republication of the original agreement, and since no present remainder interest
was created either by the agreement, or the exercise of the power, until
the death of the grantor domiciled in Florida, the validity of those
remainder interests was to be tested by Florida law..
The Conseruative View

Conservative jurisdiction, i.e., those following the New York rule,
have held purported trusts invalid on two distinct grounds. One is that
the transaction is illusory because it violates the spouse's right to the
property. Such was the case in Newman v. Dore.2" Illinois followed
Newman v. Dore in a 1944 case, 0 holding the transfer of title to the
trustee, although absolute in form, was merely colorable and illusory.
The second ground relied on by conservative jurisdictions in holding
purported trusts testamentary, is the element of intent on the part of
the grantor. After an exhaustive survey on the definition of words, the
supreme court of Missouri concluded that the grantors did not intend to
pass title in praesenti, a1 and held a trust instrument void ab initio. In
a four to three 1955 decision the Virginia court, held that a transfer of
life insurance policies was testamentary since the settlor had said in
unequivocal language that no interest was to pass during his lifetime. 2
Dunham v. Armitage"2 presented the first case in Colorado in which
a living trust and the question of the sum of powers retained by the
grantor was before the court. The court held that the reservation and
control over the property in addition to the right to revoke at the pleasure
23 1 Scott, Trusts § 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
24 12S A.2d 819 (Del. 1957).
25 The facts of the case and the circumstances are similar to National
and the court here followed the Massachusetts rule.
26 128 A.2d at 828.

Shawmut

27 The grantor exercised the power of appointment on two occasions. 128 A.2d
at 828.

2s This case comment expresses no opinion on the question of conflict of laws or

on applicability of the full faith and credit clause.

29 The court cited and relied on Restatement, Trusts, § 57(1)(2) (1935); 1 Bogert,
Trusts and Trustees §§ 103-04 (3d ed. 1952); 1 Scott, Trusts § 57.1, 57.2 (2d ed. 1956).
30 Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 11. App. 168, 54 N.E.2d 75 (1944).
31 Atlantic Nat'l Bank v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 357 Mo. 770, 211 S.W.2d 2
(1948).
32 Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank, 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 889 (1955).
2N Dunham v.
Armitage, 97 Colo. 216, 48 P.2d 797 (1935). The Dunham case, on
which the lower court relied as controlling in Von Brecht, and Smith v. Simmons,
note 36 infra, stood for the proposition that purported trust agreements are testamentary where control over the corpus has been retained by the settlor. The Simmons
case was not cited In the supreme court's opinion in Von Brecht.
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of the creator made the instrument testamentary in character. Although
there was no specific right to withdraw or consume the principal, the
lesser powers, added to the power of revocation, convinced the court
that the instrument was testamentary and not a valid living trust. Further
scrutiny of the court's opinion shows that the decision did not rest solely
on the question of powers retained by the grantor. The grantor had
stated that, in the absence of revocation, upon her death the real estate
was to become the property of the plaintiff in error. From this the court
concluded that the grantor had not intended the trust to be effective
for any purpose prior to her death.
The decision of the Colorado court rested more clearly on the
question of control retained by the grantor in Smith v. Simmons." In
this case the disposition was held to be testamentary. No power to revoke
was reserved. The court apparently took the position that no valid trust
was created because of the complete power of the purported settlor over
the property constituting the corpus. Emphasis was placed upon the
right of the alleged settlor to request and receive all or part of the corpus
at her pleasure.
Another living trust case appeared in Brown v. International Trust

Company." There the trust was upheld but no light was shed on the
present problem since the only issue to be decided was the manner in
which the power of revocation was reserved. The court refused to alter
or amend the trust on the basis of the trust being a contract between
the grantor and the trustee.
6
Reservations of power were not in issue in Richard v. James,"
where
an irrevocable trust which had been recorded the day after its execution
was upheld in the Colorado Supreme Court against a fraud charge by
the wife. The trust, in effect, was subject to a power of revocation since
the trust deed explicitly made the corpus subject to taxes and lawful
debts incurred by the grantor during his lifetime, if his estate should
be unable to pay them.
In addition to the administratrix's contention in Von Brecht that
the sum of powers reserved to the settlor amounted to absolute control,
two further attacks on the instrument had prevailed in the lower court.
The district court held that Dunham v. Armitage was controlling. In
Dunham the trust instrument had been held testamentary in nature
because of its reservation of possession, full control and the power of
revocation. However, the supreme court refused to be persuaded that
Dunham controlled Von Brecht. Rather the high court distinguished
the cases on the ground that a fact vital in Dunham, the reservation of
possession, was not present in Von Brecht.
Finally, there appeared in Von Brecht a threat to revoke the trust
unless the settlor's request for a certain investment was complied with.
In the lower court's first memorandum opinion, it was held that this
threat of revocation, in addition to the cumulative effect of the retained
powers, made the trustee a mere agent of the settlor. However, the
supreme court stated that the mere threat of revocation did not amount to
a revocation, citing Brown v. International Trust Company. 7
34 99 Colo. 227, 61 P.2d 589 (1936).
35 Brown v. International Trust Co., 130 Colo. 543, 278 P.2d 581 (1954).
36 Richard v. James, 133 Colo. 180, 292 P.2d 977 (1956).
37 130 Colo. 543, 278 P.2d 581 (1954).

INIARCH-APRIL,

1958

DICTA

Conclusion
The opinion in the Von Brecht case firmly sets forth two important
features of the law of revocable inter vivos trusts in Colorado." In the
decision, the supreme court reiterated its holding in the Brown case to
the effect that if a particular method of revocation is specified, that
procedure must be strictly followed in order to make the revocation
effective. Secondly, in regard to the accumulation of reserved powers,
the court ruled that the Von Brecht instrument was not testamentary,
holding that the settlor did not go too far in reserving the so-called veto
power concerning investments proposed by the trustee and further, that
no agency relation existed.
In summary, it is clear that the question whether an instrument is
valid as a revocable inter vivos trust or void as testamentary in character
raises persistent difficulties. As a review of the cases and authorities
reveals, there exists but a fine line of demarcation. To resolve the problem
many courts have struggled, unsuccessfully, to reach some kind of reliable
standard. The minds of the judiciary, in the majority of cases, have
arrived at similar conclusions but for varied reasons. A possible solution
is the development of a multiple standard based on a consideration of
intent, interests and instrument. If the settlor shows a bona fide intention to create a trust under which present or future interests vest in the
beneficiaries through the use of a formal instrument, the possibility of
attack as a testamentary instrument should be reduced if not completely
dismissed.
3s The Von Brecht case was reversed and remanded with directions to hear and
determine several issues presented by the pleadings only one of which was resolved
by the summary judgment order. Rehearing in the supreme court was denied March 24,
1958.
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